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Abstract:  
This paper explores the link between polarization and inequality and proposes some 
analytical methods to decompose the Duclos, Esteban, and Ray (2004) polarization 
index by population groups or income sources. In some cases, the decomposition 
methods were extended to the Esteban and Ray (1994) one. The main aim of these 
decomposition methods is to extend the interpretation derived from polarization 
indices to that of contribution components. Results drawn from Chinese data 
conclude that even if inequality has increased sharply during the last two decades, 
the pure polarization component was remained constant or even decreased on 
average. On the other hand, results from the 2004 Nigerian survey conclude that the 
population is spatially polarized, and this, based on geo-ecological zones. 
Furthermore, the two income sources, namely, Employment income and Non farm 
business income, significantly contribute to total polarization. 
 
 
Keywords: Polarization, Equity, Inequality, Decomposition 
 
JEL Classification: D63 ,  D64  
 
1 Introduction
In addition to macroeconomic performance criteria, social economic perfor-
mance has received growing interest from researchers and policymakers during
the last few decades. Indeed, there is a consensus on the importance of studying
the negative aspects of distribution of income and of taking into account social
dimensions in the design of economic policies. In general, governmental inter-
ventions are necessary to boost the main and strategic economic sectors during
times of crises; to correct the distributive failure of free market; and to ensure a
worthy level of wellbeing to population and to prevent the socioeconomic con-
ﬂicts.
Broadly, polarization refers to the disparity or divergence between objects,
attracted by different forces toward the main masses or narrowly, the grouped ob-
jects. Such phenomenon can be transposed into socioeconomic framework. With
polarization measurement, we aim to assess the importance of the more apparent
social groups, which are composed of individuals that share the same socioeco-
nomic characteristics. When interests of these apparent groups are different from
each other, they can act to defend their interests and may thus lead to the so-
called social conﬂict. The more groups are identiﬁed or their opposite interests
are higher, the greater is the intensity of conﬂict. For distributive analysis, we
simply focus on the importance of polarization in incomes1. Thus, this reduces
our space to an important socioeconomic dimension, which is the distribution of
wellbeing. Esteban and Ray (1994) argues about the relevance of studying polar-
ization by what follows:
“Why are we interested in polarization? It is our contention that the
phenomenon of polarization is closely linked to the generation of ten-
sions, to the possibilities of articulated rebellion and revolt, and to the
existence of social unrest.” (Esteban and Ray 1994, p. 820)
In general, there are tangible forces or factors that can explain the level of diver-
gence between clustered groups. For usual distributions in developing countries,
incomes of the poor and richer groups are attracted by two opposite forces. These
forces are explained mainly by the set of individual characteristics - demographic,
social, economic, etc - which determine the capacity of each individual to gen-
erate income. By limiting our focus on the two main opposite groups, situated
1Among the other dimensions of polarization that have intersected researches, one can cite the
ethnic and religious aspects. For instance, see Reynal-Querol (2002) and Horowitz (1985).
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in general at the bottom and top of the distribution of income, we redeﬁne our
polarization concept as bipolarisation2.
The theoretical frameworks for inequality and poverty were extensively and
widely developed in the last few decades compared to that of polarization. Fur-
thermore, there is an evident link between polarization and some other negative
aspects of the distribution. For instance, the severe poverty, the disappearing of
middle class or the higher level of between-group inequality are certainly related
to the polarization phenomenon. While inequality measurements are conceived to
assess the expected divergence or disparity between incomes, polarization mea-
surements are sensitive to the level of identiﬁcation of individuals by their in-
come levels. For a given population group, which is predetermined by an income
range, the higher the population size of this group, the more the group is identiﬁed.
Thus, polarization measurements are sensitive to the concentration of individuals
around their expected income. This gives additional information that inequality
and poverty measurements fail to catch.
During the last two decades, there has been a growing interest to de-
velop a theoretical framework to assess accurately polarization through in-
come levels. Pioneered by Esteban and Ray (1991) and Esteban and Ray (1994),
Foster and Wolfson (1992) and Wolfson (1994), they have proposed some mea-
surements of polarization in the distribution of incomes. An important and recent
contribution was the work of Duclos, Esteban, and Ray (2004) (DER). The DER
index is distinguished by its axiomatic approach and it obeys to a set of desirable
properties for polarization measurements. Compared to Esteban and Ray (1994)
polarization index (ER), the latter:
• is deﬁned in continues form in income;
• does not require to ﬁx arbitrarily given income ranges to identify groups;
• is normalized by population size and can be normalized by income scale.
Obviously, the normalizations by income scale and population size are funda-
mental to enable the comparison between distributions for any distributive phe-
nomenon, like poverty, inequality or polarization.
The main part of this paper is devoted to decompose polarization measure-
ments by population groups or income sources. Showing how the different popu-
lation groups or income sources contribute to polarization index can help policy-
makers to implement policies to ﬁght the drawbacks underlining the development
2Some polarization measurements are based on this bipolarisation concept. See
Wolfson (1994).
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process. Moreover, we investigate the empirical link between polarization and
inequality and highlight the difference between them. To this end, we propose a
pure polarization index to extract the contribution of the more identiﬁed groups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the DER
polarization index and we show how polarization is different from inequality by
deriving the pure popularization index. In section 3, we propose an analytical
decomposition of the DER index by population groups. The proposed decompo-
sition by income sources is presented in section 4. We illustrate, in section 5, the
proposed developments and we conclude in section 6.
2 Polarization, concept and measurements
The popular polarization measurements are based on two important ingredi-
ents: the alienation and the identiﬁcation, denoted by A and I respectively. The
greater the population concentration of a given group within a small range of in-
come, the higher the identiﬁcation the group members feel. On the other hand,
the greater the disparity of income between two individuals, the higher the alien-
ation they feel. When two groups are well identiﬁed and their average incomes
are more distant, the society may be frustrated with the apparent gap. Thus, in
contrast with inequality, polarization indices are characterized by their local sen-
sitivity to the interaction between the alienation and identiﬁcation, which forms
the so called antagonism. In general, one can divide the polarization axioms or the
desirable properties into two subsets. The ﬁrst subset is common for the majority
of distributive indices, such as:
A1: The Anonymity: Distributive indices do not depend on the individual
characteristics except its income.
A2: Population-principle: Distributive indices are invariant with the increase of
population size by replicating it.
A3: Free scale: Distributive indices are invariant with income scale.
The second subset is more speciﬁc to polarization indices. Let the local unimodal
distribution be a part of the global distribution with different averages of income:
A4: Collapsing the global distribution around its mean does not increase
polarization (Alienation sensitivity).
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A5: Collapsing the local unimodal distribution around its mean does not
decrease polarization (Identiﬁcation sensitivity).
A6: Increasing the distance, by the same level, between incomes which form
the local distribution and average income does not decrease polarization
(Interaction sensitivity).
2.1 The DER polarization index
The Duclos, Esteban, and Ray (2004) polarization index have a functional
form derived exclusively with an axiomatic approach and that is close to the func-
tional form of the Gini index to capture the alienation part. Precisely, the DER
index can be written as follows:
P =
∫ ∫
f(x)1+αf(y)|x− y|dydx, (1)
where f(.) is the density function and the parameter α is a normative parameter
that expresses the sensitivity of the index to the local identiﬁcation3. This param-
eter must be bounded and is between 0.25 and 1. This interval is mainly derived
to respect the IA interaction structure and to have an optimal tradeoff for the
sensitivity of this index between the alienation and identiﬁcation components4.
Under the simplest algebric form, one can say that the contribution of the group,
composed from individuals with income x, is the product of its identiﬁcation com-
ponent i(x) = f(x)α, multiplied by its alienation one a(x) =
∫
f(y)|x− y|dy.
The alienation component, which expresses simply the expected absolute dis-
tance between income x and the other incomes, can be decomposed into two more
comprehensible components. Indeed, one can check easily that:
|y − x| = (y − x)+ + (x− y)+, (2)
where (ε)+ = ε if ε > 0 and zero otherwise. According to Runciman (1966),
the magnitude of relative deprivation is the difference between the desired situ-
ation and the actual situation of a person5. We deﬁne the relative deprivation of
household with income x compared to that with income y as follows:
3The local identiﬁcation at income x depends on the proportion of individuals that have the
level of this income. The higher this proportion is higher, the greater is the identiﬁcation compo-
nent f(x)α.
4Ideally, the functional form must ensure that the index will not be biased or determined mainly
by one of the two IA components.
5See also Yitzhaki (1979) and Hey and Lambert (1980).
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τ(x, y) = (y − x)+ =
{
y − x if x < y
0 otherwise.
(3)
Hence, the expected deprivation of individual with income x is equal to:
δ(x) =
∫
τ(x, y)f(y)dy. (4)
Similarly, the expected surplus of individual with income x is equal to:
σ(x) =
∫
τ(y, x)f(y)dy. (5)
Thus, one can decompose the local alienation into expected deprivation plus ex-
pected surplus components.
a(x) = δ(x) + σ(x). (6)
By replacing (6) in equation (1), we ﬁnd that:
P =
∫
f(x)1+αa(x)dx (7)
=
∫
f(x)1+α [δ(x) + σ(x)] dx (8)
= D + S, (9)
whereD =
∫
f(x)1+α [δ(x)] dx is the deprivation component and the complement
part S is the surplus. When the distribution is symmetric or when the parameter α
equals zero, these two components are equal. In general, with the usual asymmet-
ric distribution of incomes, one can expect that D > S 6. The normalized DER
index can be written as follows:
P =
∫
f(x˙)1+α [δ(x˙) + σ(x˙)] dx˙, (10)
where x˙ = x/μ. As indicated by the Duclos, Esteban, and Ray (2004), to obtain
the free scale index, one has to divide the absolute polarization index by μ.μ−α.
Indeed, the part μ−α comes from the relative change between f(x)α and f(x˙)α
considering f(x˙)α = f(x)α/μα. We note again that for the normalized DER, one
can divide the latter by 2 to set its value between zero and one.
6Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos, Esteban, and Ray (2004) indicated the asymmetric im-
portance of alienation to assess polarization. This can be explained by the level of the social
ethical weight, which decreases with the increase in income.
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2.2 The DER polarization index and inequality
Recall that the Gini index represents a particular case of the DER, i.e., when
the parameter α = 0. Using equation (10), one can express the inequality with the
expected deprivation and surplus as follows7:
A =
∫
f(x˙) (δ(x˙) + σ(x˙)) dx˙ (11)
It is easy to check that the expected deprivation equals the expected surplus
at the level of population (E[δ(x)] = E[σ(x)]). When the parameter α is greater
than zero, we weight the expected local deprivation and surplus by the local iden-
tiﬁcation component (f(x)α). Except for the case where the distribution is sym-
metric, with this process, we give more weight to the poor individuals, which are
in general more identiﬁed. In addition to the parameter α, the divergence between
the DER index and inequality, measured by the Gini index, depends on the level
of asymmetry of the distribution. The other popular tool to represent and to study
inequality is the Lorenz curve. When one notes the usual Lorenz curve by L(p)
and the quantile by Q(p), the component a(Q(p)) can be written as follows:
a(Q(p)) = μ [2(1− L(p)) + pς(p)− (1− p)ς(p)− 1)] , (12)
where ς(p) = Q(p)/μ8. Based on this, the DER index can be written as follows:
P = 2
∫
f(L′(p))α [(1− L(p))− 0.5(1 + L′(p))− pL′(p))] dp (13)
When the parameter α = 0, it is straightforward to ﬁnd the usual deﬁnition of the
Gini index with the Lorenz curve9. With the usual asymmetric density functions,
the surplus component -S =
∫ 1
0
f(ς(p))α [2pς(p)− ς(p)− 1)] dp- diverges from
the deprivation one. This divergence is caused, inter alia, by the difference in
levels of identiﬁcation at the different segments of percentiles. The lower the
tangency of the Lorenz curve L′(p) is (this occurs in general in the lower tail of
7See Sen (1973), Yitzhaki (1979) and Araar and Duclos (2003).
8The deprivation for an individual with income Q(p) is δ(Q(p)) = μ−GL(p)−Q(p)(1− p)
and surplus is σ(Q(p)) = μ−GL(p)+pQ(p)−μ, where GL(p) is simply the generalized Lorenz
curve.
9Note that
∫
(2pς(p)− ς(p)− 1)dp = 1− ∫ 2L(p)dp, or simply equals to the Gini index. This
result can be derived using the integration by part, i.e. V = p and U ′ = ς(p). Recall again that the
DER index is twice the Gini when α = 0.
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the distribution), the higher is the local identiﬁcation and the more skewed the
distribution is10.
Even if the difference between inequality and polarization was already well
discussed and illustrated in the literature, some empirical studies were devoted to
check for the empirical correlation between them11. Results of these studies con-
ﬁrm such correlation when some polarization indices are used. The question that
can now be raised is: how one can explain this correlation? Recall that most of
polarization indices are sensitive to alienation, as is the case for inequality indices,
and this even if the identiﬁcation part is ignored. The magnitude of divergence be-
tween the trend of polarization and that of inequality depends on the importance of
change in the identiﬁcation component. To show this in clear way, one can recall
the other form of the DER index as proposed by Duclos, Esteban, and Ray (2004).
P = AI(α)[1 + ρ], (14)
where I(α) =
∫
f(y)1+αdy is the average identiﬁcation component and the
parameter ρ is the normalized covariance between alienation and identiﬁcation,
which equals to:
ρ =
∫
(a(x)− E[a]) (f(x)α − E[fα]) f(x)dx
AI
. (15)
If the signiﬁcant change in inequality occurs with a neglected effect on local iden-
tiﬁcation components, this decomposition shows why inequality and polarization
can follows the same path12. However, this ﬁnding cannot conﬁrm the neglected
importance of identiﬁcation to the polarization index. By their functional form,
polarization indices may be more sensitive to alienation than to identiﬁcation com-
ponents.
By pure polarization concept, we refer to polarization of the more identiﬁed
groups. Assume that f¯ is the identiﬁcation threshold, which is simply the mini-
mum level of identiﬁcation to separate between the more identiﬁed groups and the
others. Under this assumption, the new polarization index is deﬁned as follows:
P ∗ =
∫
f∗(x)1+αa(x)dx (16)
where f∗(x) = f(x) if f(x) > f¯ and zero otherwise.
10Note that when L′(p) is low, the increase in the ranked incomes is small and this implies a
higher level of f(L′(p) = Q(p)/μ) and high level of identiﬁcation.
11See Ravallion and Chen (1997) and Zhang and Kanbur (2001).
12In general, an increase in inequality involves a positive change of the parameter ρ and a
neglected change in average identiﬁcation component.
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Theorem 1 For any given distribution, there is a unique equivalent distribution,
which satisﬁes simultaneously the following constraints:
A: Have the same level of inequality, measured by the Gini index;
B: Have the same average income;
C: Have a uniform distribution and incomes can be deﬁned by: yi = a + bi,
where yi is the ith ranked income, in ascending order.
Proof. Easily, one has to resolve a system of two equations with two parameters.
The ﬁrst equation refers to the equality between averages of income, i.e. a +
b
∫
ydy − μ = 0. The second refers to the equality between the Gini’s social
welfare, such that:
∫
(a + by)υ(y)dy − ξA = 0, where υ(y) is a function of social
ethical weights and ξA =
∫
yυ(y)dy.
This equivalent distribution can be perceived as a counterfactual distribution,
with the minimum level of identiﬁed groups with the prevailed level of inequality.
One can check easily that for the uniform distribution, the link between the Gini
and DER index is as follows:
P u = (E[f(.)]μ)α A. (17)
The density f(.) is the same for all incomes and is equal to the inverse of pop-
ulation size when the distance between two successive incomes, for the uniform
distribution, is scaled to one. This level of density may be the standard for thresh-
old identiﬁcation, up to which the apparent groups are detected, as indicated pre-
viously. If one assumes that the uniform distribution is the initial one, the pure
polarization can be perceived as the impact of the transformation of this uniform
distribution to the more polarized. If one focuses simply on this side of polariza-
tion, he has to add the following axiom, which pure polarization measurements
must fulﬁll.
A7: Concentration focusing axiom: The pure polarization measurements are
insensitive to the distribution of the less identiﬁed groups, i.e. (f(x) < f¯ ).
3 Decomposing the DER index by population
groups
Before going into the development of the decomposition of the DER index
by group components, one has to keep in mind the difference between the main
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objectives of this decomposition. Indeed, questions of interest can be addressed
as follows:
1. How population groups contribute to total polarization?
2. How population groups can explain polarization?
3. What are the main masses -modals of the distribution- that attract each pop-
ulation group?
For instance, for the ﬁrst question, if we assume that all groups have identical dis-
tributions of income, but differ by their population size, the relative contribution
of each group must depend simply on its population share (See the illustration
of this case in ﬁgure (1)) . For the second question, if we assume that there is
no income overlap, the retained groups represent well the different masses of the
distribution (See the illustration of this case in ﬁgure (2))13. In this case, by their
average incomes and population shares, groups can reproduce the distribution of
income. For the third question, assume that groups are formed according to house-
hold head education attainment. The two main masses that can attract mainly the
illiterate group will be those situated at the bottom of the distribution (for instance,
they can be the two ﬁrst modals of distribution, presented in ﬁgure (3)).
In chronic way, the decomposition of the Gini index by population groups
was pioneered by Bhattacharaya and Mahalanobis (1967). There was a growing
interest to develop well founded methods for decomposition of this inequality
index by sub-population groups 14. Assume that the population is composed of the
G exclusive population groups (rural vs urban households or group households
according to household head education attainment, etc.). In general, when we
suppose that the between-group inequality represents the inequality when each
household has the average income of its group, the algebraic decomposition of
the Gini index takes the following form15:
A =
∑
g
φgψgAg + A¯ + R, (18)
where φg and ψg are respectively the population and income shares of group g.
The component A¯ is the between group inequality and equals simply to the Gini
index when each individual have the average income of its group. One can recall
13Gradin (2000) used the generalized ER index (1999) and has proposed an indicator to assess
how the formed population groups reproduce polarization in distribution of incomes.
14See Pyatt (1976), Lambert and Aronson (1993) and Araar (2006).
15See also the interpretation of Lambert and Aronson (1993).
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here that if group incomes do not overlap, the residual part of this decomposition
(R) vanishes. The lower the residual of the relative contribution is, the more
signiﬁcant the explanation of the formed population to polarization. In this sense,
the decomposition of the Gini index may be useful to shed light on this aspect
and one can use the indicator R/A to assess the explanatory power of the formed
groups to polarization.
Now we turn to the decomposition of the DER index by population groups. If
one notes the density function for group g by fg and based on equation (8), the
contribution of individual(s) with income x to the DER index is as follows:
c(x) =
a(x)f(x)1+α
μ1−α
. (19)
The alienation component a(x) for the individual with income x belonging to
group g can be decomposed as follows:
a(x) = φgag(x) + a˜g(x), (20)
where ag(x) is the alienation for the individual at the level of its group g and a˜g(x)
the alienation component at population level when the within-group alienation is
ignored. Let πg(x) denotes the local proportion of individuals belonging to group
g and having income x. Let again cg(x) denotes the local contribution of group g
with income x to the DER polarization index16:
cg(x) = πg(x)f(x)
αf(x)a(x)
μ1−α
(21)
=
μ1−αg
μ1−α
[
πg(x)φgag(x)f(x)
1+α
μ1−αg
]
+
πg(x)a˜(x)f(x)
1+α
μ1−α
(22)
= φαgψ
1−α
g
[
πg(x)ag(x)f(x)
1+α
μ1−αg
]
+
πg(x)a˜(x)f(x)
1+α
μ1−α
. (23)
Based on these local group contributions, one can write the DER index as follows:
P =
∑
g
∫
cg(x)dx. (24)
16With this decomposition, the local contribution of the group to the local identiﬁcation is at-
tributed linearly, i.e. ig(x) = πg(x)f(x)α. One can propose more reﬁned forms of attributions,
but one must maintain the equality:
∑
ig(x) = i(x). With the use of household surveys, the
impact of such approximation is insigniﬁcant, since it is rare to ﬁnd the same level of incomes for
two samples of households.
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Hence, the DER index can be decomposed as follows:
P =
∑
g
φ1+αg ψ
1−α
g RgPg︸ ︷︷ ︸
W
+ P˜︸︷︷︸
B
, (25)
where
Rg =
∫
ag(x)πg(x)f(x)
1+αdx
φg
∫
ag(x)fg(x)1+αdx
, (26)
and P˜ is the DER polarization index when the within-group polarization or in-
equality is ignored. If group incomes do not overlap, (πg(x) = 1 ∀x), the com-
ponent Rg equals simply to 1. In general, in addition to the population share, the
component Rg depends again on the correlation between the density function of
the group and that of the population. One can check easily that for the special
case, when α = 0, this decomposition is similar to that of the Gini index17. Let
P¯ denote the between-group polarization component, which is simply the polar-
ization index when we suppose that the within-group polarization is suppressed.
This is equivalent to assuming that each individual have the average income of
its group. The functional form of P¯ is practically similar to that proposed by
Esteban and Ray (1994) and can be deﬁned as follows:
P¯ =
∑
g
φ1+αg a(μ˙g), (27)
where μ˙g =
μg
μ
and a(μ˙g) =
∑
h φh|μ˙g − μ˙h|. Based on the analytical approach
for the decomposition of the Gini index, suppressing the alienation at group levels
makes the between-group component lower than the Gini index. However, with
polarization indices, this process has two opposite effects. It is true that the alien-
ation is reduced, but the local identiﬁcation increases in general with this process
and it can happen that P¯ > P . When we attribute the between-group polarization
to that implied by the interpersonal alienation between groups, the component B
equals the between-group polarization component, as shown in equation (25) 18.
The indicator (1 −W/P ) shows how much groups are locally polarized. Perfect
identiﬁcation of groups and lower local polarization coincide, in general, with the
17Note that when the parameter α = 0, we have Rg = 1. In addition, the residue can be
attributed to the between-group component when the latter is based on interpersonal comparison
between groups.
18See Dagum (1997) and Araar (2006) for the case of the decomposition of the Gini index.
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higher relative contribution of the between-group component to the polarization
index. The indicator B/W can be used to show how much the formed groups
polarize the distribution19. Now we turn to the third main objective of decompo-
sition by group population, which is to identify the main masses that attract each
group. Starting from equations (8) and (24), one can write the following:
P =
∑
g
1
μ1−α
∫
([δ(x) + σ(x)]f(x)α)πg(x)f(x)d(x)dx (28)
=
∑
g
Dg + Sg. (29)
If group g is composed of a signiﬁcant part of poor individuals, the ratio Dg/Sg >
0 will be relatively higher than that of the other groups. In such a case, the group
is more attracted by masses situates in the lower tail of the distribution. The
conclusion is the inverse for the wealthy groups.
4 Decomposition of the DER index by income com-
ponents
The decomposition of polarization indices by income sources allows having
a clear idea on how each source contributes to the total polarization. First, sup-
pose that the sum of K income sources equals the total income and the amount of
source k, noted by sk, is non negative. To develop the intuition of such decompo-
sition and to impose some desired rules, one can argue the following:
1. If distributions of income sources are similar, the relative contribution of
each source must simply be equal to its income share.
2. Assume that there are only two similar income sources. Increasing
polarization in a given source, by a series of polarization transformations,
must imply a higher contribution of this source to total polarization.
For the decomposition of the Gini index, a straightforward method was proposed
by Rao (1969). With Rao’s method, the contribution of each income source equals
19Note that the idea of using the ratio between the between-group and the within-group com-
ponents of inequality to catch the importance of polarization of groups was already proposed by
Zhang and Kanbur (2001). Precisely, they use the generalized entropy index of inequality to esti-
mate the within and between-group inequality components.
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to the product between its income share and its coefﬁcient of concentration. Start-
ing from equation (6), one can write the following:
a(x) =
∫
[τ(x, y) + τ(y, x)] f(y)dy
=
∫ [
τ(
∑
k
sk(x),
∑
k
sk(y)) + τ(
∑
k
sk(y),
∑
k
sk(x))
]
f(y)dy
=
∑
k
∫
[(sk(x)− sk(y))I(x < y) + (sk(y)− sk(x))I(y < x)] f(y)dy
=
∑
k
ak(x). (30)
The term ak(x) gives the level of alienation in income source k for the individual
with income x, but conditioned by the validity of deprivation using total incomes
I(x < y) and the validity of surplus I(y < x). By replacing this ﬁnding in
equation (7), one can ﬁnd that:
P =
1
μ1−α
∫
f(x)1+αa(x)dx (31)
=
∑
k
ψk
∫
f(x)1+αak(x)dx
ψαk μ
α−1
k
(32)
=
∑
k
ψkCPk (33)
where CPk is the pseudo-polarization index of income source k. It is similar to the
concentration index except for its sensitivity to income identiﬁcation component,
f(x)α. One can remark that if the parameter α equals zero, this decomposition is
the same as that of Rao20. This analytical development shows that the contribution
of each income source mainly depends on its income share and on its pseudo
polarization index. The more equally distributed is the income source, the lower
is its pseudo polarization index. Furthermore, for a given level of the parameter α,
one can check for the progressivity of income source under polarization context.
First, let the usual transformation of incomes to quantiles be F−1(x) = Q(p),
where F () is simply the cumulative density function. One can compare between
20With term ψαk in the denominator, the pseudo-polarization index is free scale and easily com-
parable with the DER polarization index. This enables us to judge the direction of the contribution
simply by checking the sign of (CPk − P ).
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the Cumulative-Polarization Curve -CC(p)- and the Concentration-Polarization
curve -CCk(p)- to check for the progressivity of income sources21:
CC(p) =
1
μ1−α
∫ p
0
f(Q(p))αa(Q(p))dp, (34)
CCk(p) =
1
ψαk μ
α−1
k
∫ p
0
f(Q(p))αak(Q(p))dp. (35)
For the analytical issue, it will be useful to assess the impact of the marginal
increase in income source k on the polarization. First, assume that λk − 1 ≥ 0,
denotes the proportion of increase in income source k, i.e. x(λk) = (x−sk)+λksk.
The impact of this increase on the DER index is as follows22:
∂P (λk)
∂λk
∣∣∣∣
λk=1
=
∫
([αf(x)α−1g(x)sk(x)− (1− α)ψkf(x)α]a(x) + f(x)αak(x)) f(x)dx
μ1−α
,(36)
where g(x) denotes the ﬁrst derivative of the density function at x. If income
source is simply a constant, the impact can be written as follows:
∂P (c)
∂c
= (1 + c/μ)α−1 P (37)
5 Illustration Using Chinese and Nigerian Data
To illustrate how the evolution of polarization can differ from that of inequal-
ity, we illustrate this using a panel survey from rural China. This panel survey
was conducted during China’s economic transition and covers the period 1986-
2002. Recent descriptive research emphasizes the marked decline in the incidence
of poverty over the twenty-ﬁve years of economic reform in China accompanied
by an increase in inequality23. The data comes from annual household surveys
conducted by the Survey Department of the Research Center on Rural Economy
21Here, one must recall that the cumulative polarization curve was proposed by
El Lahga (2005).
22See Appendix 1 for the prove.
23For instance, see Benjamin, Brandt, Giles, and Wang (2005) and Khan (2004).
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(RCRE) in Beijing. We use household level surveys from 82 villages in nine
provinces (Anhui, Gansu, Guangdong, Henan, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jilin, Shanxi, and
Sichuan) where households were surveyed annually from 1986 through 2002, with
gaps in 1992 and 1994 when funding difﬁculties prevented survey activities.24 In
each province, counties in the upper, middle and lower income terciles were se-
lected, from which a village was then randomly chosen. Depending on village
size, between 40 and 120 households were randomly surveyed in each village.
The panel component of the household survey (from panel villages) includes 3983
households per year from 1986 to 2002. Our measure of consumption includes
nondurable goods expenditure per capita. All income and expenditure are deﬂated
to 1990 prices using the NBS rural consumer price index for each province.
One additional advantage of using panel data is to prevent our estimates from
unnecessary noise which may occur as a result of the changes in the structure
of the sample. This allows us to focus more on the nature of evolvement of the
different distributive phenomena.
In ﬁgure (4), we show the trend of inequality and polarization, measured re-
spectively by the Gini and DER indices, when the parameter of identiﬁcation
α = 0.5. As noted in earlier work and conﬁrmed with this ﬁgure, inequality and
polarization seems to be highly correlated. As reported previously, this correlation
may be implied by the biased weight effect of alienation on polarization indices.
Figure (5) shows the trends of alienation -Gini index- and average identiﬁcation
components. It is clear that population groups became less identiﬁed with income
distribution in China during the last years. To show how polarization can evolve
differently from inequality, we present in ﬁgure (6) the proposed pure polarization
index. Starting form results reported in this ﬁgure, it seems that inequality and po-
larization have evolved differently. More important, the pure part of polarization
has decreased in average during this studied period. This result is not surprising
since poverty in China has signiﬁcantly decreased during this period and this must
lighten the level of polarization.
Now, to illustrate the proposed methods for the decomposition of the polariza-
tion index, we use a recent and rich nationally representative survey of Nigerian
households (NLSS). This was carried out between September 2003 and August
24These 82 villages are a subsample of the 110 villages originally surveyed in 1986 in which
survey administrators successfully followed a signiﬁcant share of households through 2002. The
complete RCRE survey covers over 22,000 households in 300 villages in 31 provinces and admin-
istrative regions. RCRE’s complete national survey is 31 percent of the annual size of the NBS
rural household survey. By agreement, we have obtained access to data from nine provinces, or
roughly one-third of the RCRE survey.
16
2004 by Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics. Nigeria is the most populous
country in Africa. In addition, it is one of the very few countries in Africa where
income is surveyed, and this is of course important in motivating our choice of this
particular country. Out of the 22,200 households that were randomly selected in
the NLSS, we remove those that did not report their income components. There-
fore, 17764 observations were used for this application. We use per capita total
household income as a measure of living standards. Household observations are
weighted by household size and sampling weights.
In table (1), we perform the decomposition of total polarization (DER with
α = 0.75) by population groups. The exclusive population groups are formed
according to the six main geopolitical zones of Nigeria25. First, one can recall
that many studies have found that the northern zones are relatively poorer than the
southern zones. Through the reported results in table (1), one can note that even if
groups differ by their population size or income share, their level of polarization
is relatively higher and the northern zones has practically the same level of po-
larization. The north-west region has the highest level of the ratio deﬁcit/surplus
and contributes the most to the intra-group component. The contribution of the
between-group polarization is higher and this seems to conﬁrm that Nigerian pop-
ulation is spatially polarized in wealth. One can report again the pure between-
group polarization, P¯ equals to 0.063. Its lowest level indicates the non neglected
impact of reducing the within-group disparities on inequality, poverty and polar-
ization26.
To show how each income source contribute to the total polarization, we use
six main income sources. As shown in table (2), the components Employment
income and Non farm business income contribute more to total polarization, and
this, for two levels of parameter of identiﬁcation (α=0.25 and α = 0.75). The
pseudo-polarization index for the Agricultural income component is the lowest.
Indeed, this phenomenon of lower disparity in agricultural incomes is conﬁrmed
by many empirical studies concerning developing countries.
6 Conclusion
Inequality and polarization phenomena continue to receive a growing interest
from researchers and policymakers. There is a consensus on the importance of
maintaining an adequate level of equity in the distribution of wealth in developing
25These geopolitical zones cut across the three main agro-ecological zones of the country.
26See Araar and Awoyemi (2006) and Araar and Duclos (2007).
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and developed countries. Indeed, for developing countries, stakeholders advo-
cate the reduction of the alarming disparities to enhance the impact of economic
growth on poverty. For developed countries, there is a consensus on the necessity
of ensuring a minimum level of equity to combat the social exclusion of a large
part of the population or the disappearance of the middle class.
The theoretical framework for inequality measurement or its decomposition
by the distributive components was widely and extensively developed during the
last century. The proposed developments for polarization are recent and seem to
be less extended in comparison to those for inequality and poverty. In general, po-
larization measurements of income are characterized by their sensitivities to the
concentration of population groups meaning income levels. Assessing the level of
polarization is not sufﬁcient to propose adequate policies to ﬁght this distributive
phenomenon. In this paper we provide some theoretical developments to decom-
pose the DER polarization index by population groups or income sources. In our
knowledge, there is no other work devoted to the decomposition of polarization in-
dices by distributive components. For policy purpose, these decompositions may
help to target the apparent poor groups of population or to propose efﬁcient redis-
tributive corrections. Also, in this paper we focus on the empirical and analytical
links between inequality and polarization and we propose the pure polarization in-
dex with the new axiom concerning the focus of pure polarization measurements
on the apparent or identiﬁed groups.
Using the Chinese panel data, which cover the rural area between the years
1986 to 2002, we have shown a close link between trends of inequality and po-
larization. More importantly, we have shown that the pure polarization compo-
nent has evolved differently with inequality. To illustrate the proposed theoretical
framework for the decomposition of polarization by population groups or income
sources, we have used the Nigerian household survey for the year of 2004. Re-
sults from these decompositions conﬁrm the spatial polarization of the Nigerian
society. Starting from results of decomposition by income sources, we conclude
that components Employment income and Non farm business income contribute
more to total polarization in Nigeria.
Note ﬁnally that the proposed theoretical developments are made to contribute
to enrich the existing distributive tools, which are usually used to help policy-
makers in shaping policies designed to ﬁght simultaneously the different negative
aspects of distribution. In addition, analytical developments may contribute to
shed light on the different aspects that surround the polarization concept and to
attract the interest of researchers to continue to investigate and study the polariza-
tion phenomenon.
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Figure 1: Global and local symmetric unimodal distribution
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Figure 4: Inequality and polarization trend in China
(Rural China: 1986-2002)
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Figure 5: The trend of identiﬁcation and alienation components
(Rural China: 1986-2002)
.6
.6
5
.7
.7
5
.8
Id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n
.2
.2
5
.3
.3
5
.4
G
in
i
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Gini index (Alienation) Identification (alpha=0.5)
Figure 6: Inequality and pure polarization index
(Rural China: 1986-2002)
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Appendix 1 Marginal increase in income source
component and the DER index
Recall that with the scheme of proportional increase in income source k, the
income x(λk) can be deﬁned as follows:
x(λk) = x + (λk − 1)sk(x). (A.1)
The average of x(λk) is give in its turn by
μ(λk) = μ(1 + (λk − 1)ψk). (A.2)
In discrete form, the DER index being deﬁned as:
P (λk) =
∑
i f(xi(λk))
αai(λk)
Nμ(λk)1−α
(A.3)
Where N denotes the population size. Using the chain rule method of derivative,
we have inter alia, ∂f(xi(λk))
α
∂λk
= αf(xi)
α−1g(xi)sk(xi), where g(xi) denotes the
ﬁrst derivative of density function with respect to xi. Further, when incomes are
ranked in ascending order, one can ﬁnd that ∂ai(λk)
∂λk
= ai,k, where ai,k have the
same deﬁnition as ai except the change of arguments, i.e. xi by sk(xi). If we note
the numerator and the denominator of the last equation by A and B respectively,
we have then:
∂P (λk)
∂λk
∣∣∣∣
λk=1
=
A′
B
− B
′A
B2
(A.4)
where
A′
B
= α
∑
i f(xi)
α−1g(xi)sk(xi)ai
Nμ1−α
+
∑
i f(xi)
αai,k
Nμ1−α
(A.5)
= ψk(Zk + CPk) (A.6)
Values of density function and its derivative can be estimated using the Gaussian
kernel method. For the other side of equation, we have:
B′A
B2
= (1− α)ψk
∑
i f(xi)
αai
Nμ1−α
(A.7)
= (1− α)ψkP (A.8)
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Hence, one can write the impact as follows:
∂P (λk)
∂λk
∣∣∣∣
λk=1
=
∑
i[αf(xi)
α−1g(xi)sk(xi)− (1− α)ψkf(xi)α]ai + f(xi)αai,k
Nμ1−α
(A.9)
The impact in continues form is then:
∂P (λk)
∂λk
∣∣∣∣
λk=1
=
∫
([αf(x)α−1g(x)sk(x)− (1− α)ψkf(x)α]a(x) + f(x)αak(x)) f(x)dx
μ1−α
,
(A.10)
and in more compact format:
∂P (λk)
∂λk
∣∣∣∣
λk=1
= ψk [Zk + CPk − (1− α)P ] (A.11)
Obviously, one can check easily that when α = 0, the derived impact is similar to
that with the Gini index, i.e. ψk(Ck − A) where Ck is the concentration index of
income source k.
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